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"I'm set up to fail here," said a miner at the Upper Big Branch mine in
West Virginia.' He was supposed to spread rock dust around the sprawling
underground mine to prevent explosions, but dusting machines were broken,
and there were not adequate supplies.2 Mining explosions can be caused
when methane buildup contacts a heat source, when particles of coal dust
contact a heat source, or a combination of both.3 Large fans circulating air
can prevent the buildup of both methane and dust.4 Limestone powder or rock
dust can render the coal dust inert and also absorb heat from any explosion
to make it more minor.' Here in the Upper Big Branch mine, though, as
another miner said, "so often, I couldn't count," there was "low air," or
improper ventilation.6 A mining superintendent described a far-reaching
conspiracy to hide a range of persistent violations from inspectors and to
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falsify records, all for cost-cutting reasons.' In April 2010, a massive
explosion in the mine claimed the lives of twenty-nine workers.' It was the
deadliest mining disaster in the United States in forty years.'
Five years later, Don Blankenship, the former CEO of Massey Coal,
faced federal criminal charges at a trial. In December 2015, Blankenship was
acquitted of the most serious charges of securities fraud and conspiracy and
was convicted of a misdemeanor mine-safety offense.'o The trial lasted
twenty-four days, and the jury deliberated for nine days." At sentencing in
April 2016, he told the judge, "[i]t's important to me that everyone knows
that I am not guilty of a crime."l2
The judge, describing Blankenship's remarkable rise to head Massey
Coal, said, "Instead of being able to tout you as one of West Virginia's
success stories, however, we are here as a result of your part in a dangerous
conspiracy." 3 Blankenship received a prison sentence of one year, less than
those of underlings who pleaded guilty and fully cooperated with
prosecutors.1 4 The rejected charges could have earned him up to a thirty-one-
year sentence."
But any criminal conviction of a CEO of a corporation is a rare event.
After all, Blankenship denied knowledge of day-to-day affairs at the mine.16
He could afford top lawyers; he ran up $5.8 million in legal fees even before
the trial began.'7 (By comparison, court-appointed lawyers for indigent
defendants are paid on average about $53 an hour in West Virginia, and the
average case charges $754 in costs.)'" Indeed, the company that bought
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Massey Coal is obligated to pay those legal fees, a court has ruled.19 Having
served his sentence and lost on appeal, Blankenship is seeking certiorari from
the U.S. Supreme Court.20
The defense costs in that one case may run up to as high as half of the
state of Louisiana's entire annual budget for public defense, and perhaps far
more. In Louisiana, the criminal justice equivalent of bread lines formed in
2016 across the state as deep cuts in public defenders' budgets forced cuts to
services. The entire system went bust. A person charged with a crime may
literally have to take a number and wait to hear from a lawyer. In Orleans
Parish, where the public defender must handle over 20,000 cases a year,
hundreds of cases have been refused and more people linger on a wait list.2 1
In the meantime, these people may languish in jail, perhaps for something
they did not do, or for minor crimes that should not even result in jail time.
Or they may plead guilty to avoid remaining in limbo. Even in the most
serious death penalty cases, delays are growing, and where fourteen districts
could not keep up with caseloads in 2016, 33 of 44 public defender districts
could not keep up with caseloads in 2017.22 The Chief Justice declared an
emergency lack of funding, and a new constitutional challenge is underway.23
Public defenders share a paltry $33 million annual budget 24 in a state that
would, if it were a country, have the highest imprisonment rate in the entire
world. 25 Perversely, the main source for public-defense budgets comes from
traffic-ticket revenue.26
The state of criminal justice in America today is deeply paradoxical.
Criminal justice is rationed in the land of the free. Indigent people may serve
long sentences for crimes that many people believe do not deserve harsh
punishment. In contrast, for some of the most serious business crimes, elites
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can afford impressive legal teams to defend them. We are teetering at the
edge of a mass incarceration binge. Lawmakers are reconsidering overly
harsh criminal punishments. At the same time, eight years later, people are
still furious that elite criminals and CEOs avoided criminal punishment in the
wake of the last financial crisis. Many have complained that no Wall Street
bankers went to jail. With crime dropping, prison populations are finally
declining, slightly at least, after decades of explosive growth.2 7 Yet the new
presidential Administration has called for a renewed focus on law and order,
and the Attorney General has adopted severe, new criminal-charging
policies.2 8 Perhaps mass incarceration will remain with us longer than
optimists have thought. Regardless, to make a serious dent in mass
incarceration, the reforms that so many states have adopted will have to be
pushed to the next level.
What do these conflicting tendencies mean? Why do we so easily put
vast numbers of people in prison for minor offenses yet struggle to hold
business criminals accountable? Three new books shed light on those
questions from very different perspectives. They together point the way
toward a saner criminal justice system, at a moment when it seems as if some
Americans are again licking their lips at the prospect of another binge of self-
defeating punishment, while others remain committed to reducing the costs
of mass incarceration.
First, I discuss the new book by business professor Eugene Soltes titled
Why They Do It,29 which explores psychological research on risk-taking by
corporate criminals. Second, I discuss law professor Sam Buell's Capital
Offenses,30 an engaging book that examines why it is so challenging to punish
business crimes due to the structure of the economy, corporations, and our
federal criminal justice system. Third, I turn to law professor Darryl Brown's
Free Market Criminal Justice,31 which carefully argues that free market
ideology defines American criminal justice. I conclude by exploring the
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implications of these arguments and this research for mass incarceration as
well as corporate accountability at the high and low ends of our criminal
justice system-we are finally turning a comer on mass incarceration in this
country, and the problems and solutions that these authors identify partly
explain why and whether better things or new fears lie around that comer.
I. Why Do White-Collar Criminals Do It?
Mass incarceration is premised on the idea that criminals do morally bad
things and must be locked up as punishment for those ill deeds. Corporate
executives, though, when they are accused of serious business crimes, say
things like "the world is not black and white," and "you can't make the
argument that the public was harmed by anything I did."32 More candidly,
Bernard Madoff said, "When I look back, it wasn't as if I couldn't have said
no."33 In his revealing new book, Soltes explores, as the book is titled, Why
They Do It. Soltes interviewed financial criminals by writing to them in
prison and examined psychological research on risk-taking.
Unfortunately, Soltes uncovers how, much like our stereotype of street
criminals, these sophisticated businesspeople relied on their intuitions and
their gut. A cost-benefit analysis or a rational weighing of the chances and
consequences of getting caught does not match how these criminals actually
think, Soltes argues. He quotes a senior partner at KPMG who engaged in
securities fraud and recalled later, "I never once thought about the costs
versus rewards."34 He quotes Andrew Fastow of Enron, who describes how
"we thought we were really clever" when finding ways to creatively interpret
the law to keep financial transactions off of balance sheets.3 5 Madoff
described how he knew "the rules and regulations better than most people,"
and could not say that he was "ignorant" of the law.36 He described how he
began to mount losses in his investment advisory business because he
"figured that eventually things would change and then [he would] get to
actually start doing the model trades."37 He did not disclose these problems
to clients or return the money, a "comedy of errors" began as he took money
from hedge funds to "cover the losses," and then the situation got worse and
worse, turning "into a total fiasco."38 Rather than confront the problem early
on and lose face to a smaller group of investors, Madoff leveraged the
32. SOLTES, supra note 29, at 4, 165.
33. Id. at 287.
34. Id. at 99.
35. Id. at 234.
36. Id. at 289.
37. Id. at 297.
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problem even more and gave the impression that the business was going
better and better, when in fact it had turned into a Ponzi scheme.39
These compelling accounts illustrate how executives can make
decisions for personal reasons, having to do with appetite for risk and pride,
that may now affect not just their friends in high society and in business but
millions of shareholders and the public. Soltes argues this "fundamentally
shifted the psychology of harm."40 Executives no longer receive "emotional
feedback" from their decisions.4' The victims are anonymous. And the
corporate criminals may simply not think about the broad social
consequences of their actions. An executive who paid bribes to foreign
government officials explained, "I looked at these payments as necessary to
sell a product. I never felt I was doing anything wrong."4 2 An executive who
signed false reports said, "I know this is going to sound bizarre, but when I
was signing the documents I didn't think of that as lying."4 3 Why? It was
because he felt "a difference between filling out a form," even with false
information, "and flat out looking someone in the eye and lying to them.""
Or the executive may know it is wrong but feel justified by observing
that peers are all doing the same thing. Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski
explained that the accounting gimmicks he tried were no different than those
used at General Electric (GE), which the SEC later accused of bending "the
accounting rules beyond the breaking point."45 And as to using corporate
funds to support a "lavish lifestyle," well, he said, "Every CEO before me
had short-term purchases that they were doing."4 6 He noted that when he was
CEO, the Tyco "board would give me anything I wanted. Anything."47
Culture in industry and culture in a company can explain serious and even
criminal risk-taking.
As Soltes explains, we need to make sure that people hear independent
voices so that people do not just make risky or corrupt decisions because they
are the path of least resistance. 48 Punishing people after the fact may not
prevent corporate crime nearly as effectively. Nor may simply teaching
business ethics solve the problem if the jobs themselves are not structured so
that the work is done with independent review, with "uncomfortable
39. Id. at 300-01.
40. Id. at 123.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 125.
44. Id. at 126.
45. Id. at 148.
46. Id. at 149.
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48. See id. (explaining the importance of uncomfortable dissonance by opining that human
behavior and decision-making often remain static unless influenced by external factors).
[Vol. 96:163168
The Boom & Bust of American Imprisonment
dissonance," and with questioning of decisions.49 Isolated people making
highly significant and risky decisions is a recipe for disaster.
Corporations, Soltes argues, bear the blame for putting individuals in
those situations, and they should themselves be punished for not creating
better norms of conduct.o As one convicted CFO that Soltes quotes says,
"What we all think is, when the big moral challenge comes, I will rise to the
occasion."" However, "[t]here's not actually that many of us that will
actually rise to the occasion. . . I didn't realize I would be a felon."52 Perhaps
individuals are not fully to blame, however, and we must turn to "the policies
that institutions create."53
II. The Structure of Corporate Crime
Criminal law is designed to provide a voice of reason, to use punishment
to deter people from considering committing crimes. Law professor Sam
Buell has written Capital Offenses, an elegant book examining why it is so
challenging to punish business crimes, even for our incredibly powerful and
well-resourced federal prosecutors.54
Many prominent voices in the wake of the financial crisis have
complained that individual corporate executives have eluded punishment.5
The Department of Justice made high-profile revisions to its corporate
charging policies in fall 2015 to focus on individual accountability in
corporate investigations. 56 However, Buell is skeptical that such changes will
lead to more accountability at the top.57 Buell emphasizes that the one percent
can elude punishment for a reason.8 Passing harsher criminal laws and
49. Id. at 311, 315.
50. Id. at 326.
51. Id. at 313.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 327.
54. BUELL, supra note 30, at xv.
55. See, e.g., Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been
Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles
/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-why-no-executive-prosecutions/ [https://perma.cc/8HDD-EBXG]
(pointing out that, despite many Americans losing their jobs and homes as a result of the financial
crisis, many of the high-level employees of major financial institutions have not answered for their
roles in causing the downturn); Press Release, Merkley Blasts "Too Big to Jail" Policy for
Lawbreaking Banks, JEFF MERKLEY: U.S. SENATOR FOR OREGON (Dec. 13, 2012),
https://www.merkley.senate.gov/news/press-releases/merkley-blasts-too-big-to-jail-policy-for-
lawbreaking-banks [https://perma.cc/WC3L-KSB4] (noting Senator Merkley's disdain for the U.S.
Justice Department's "deferred prosecution" policy for large financial institutions).
56. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. AT-rORNEYS' MANUAL, §§ 9-28.000 (2015); see also Brandon
L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60,
64 (2016) (describing how the revised Department of Justice guidelines instruct prosecutors to focus
on individual wrongdoing).
57. BUELL, supra note 30, at 257.
58. Id. at 178-79 (describing defenses in white-collar criminal matters that go to whether the
conduct amounts to a crime).
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sentences will likely make no difference, Buell describes.5 9 We did not see
more prosecutions when Congress enacted harsher sentences in the wake of
the Enron-era financial scandals. 6 0 Financial crimes are complex, and CEOs
and white-collar offenders can hire the best lawyers to defend them. They
can take their cases to expensive, lengthy trials, and sometimes they get
acquitted.
It is not just privilege, Buell describes, although he details how
companies normally pay the costs of lawyers for their executives and their
employees and how the costs can run into the millions of dollars.6' It is harder
than you think to prove white-collar cases. We reward, and even
mythologize, "talented innovators" and companies that take risks. The line
between creative business strategy-finding a loophole in the law-and
outright breaking the law may be very fine. And financial crimes are often
vaguely defined.
The corporation itself, however, creates a real obstacle to investigating
individual accountability. Buell begins his book with a wonderful definition
from Ambrose Bierce's The Devil's Dictionary, defining a corporation as
"[a]n ingenious device for securing individual profit without individual
responsibility."62 Corporate-crime cases are so challenging to investigate
precisely because corporations are complex entities. Many people may be
involved in a crime, and sorting out who knew what can be impossible, even
with the company providing the emails and the interviews with employees.
Buell describes the aftermath of the British Petroleum (BP) Deepwater
Horizon explosion, in which the company paid billions in fines, but only
lower-level employees were charged and convicted.6 3 The higher up the chain
of responsibility, the more plausible deniability insulates. The case for
criminal accountability becomes more "you didn't do yourjob well" and less
"you did the following thing that caused that terrible explosion and spill."'
The case against Blankenship required the cooperation of the company
that bought Massey Coal. It built on an earlier investigation and report to the
59. See id. at 233 (explaining that harsher punishment of business-crime offenders will not
change the problem of business crime).
60. See id. at 225-27 (chronicling harsher sentencing for white-collar crimes following
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank but failing to mention any change in the rate of prosecution);
Alison Frankel, Sarbanes-Oxley's Lost Promise: Why CEOs Haven't Been Prosecuted, THOMSON
REUTERS (July 27, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/07/27/sarbanes-oxleys-lost-
promise-why-ceos-havent-been-prosecuted [https://perma.cc/39AH-3FJW] (describing criminal
prosecutions of CEOs under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the ten years since its passage as "as rare as
a blue moon").
61. BUELL, supra note 24, at 193.
62. Id. at ix.
63. Id. at 109-12.
64. Id. at 111.
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Governor.6 5 Prosecutors charged supervisors and got them to cooperate to
provide evidence against the man at the top. And there was sheer
happenstance. Like President Richard Nixon, Blankenship had secretly tape
recorded his office.66 In one of the eighteen tapes played at trial, Blankenship
was recorded speaking about a "terrible document" outlining safety
violations at the mine.67 Without a tape like that, perhaps no one at the top
would normally be held accountable. That is the typical result when
corporations enter settlements with federal prosecutors-no employees are
prosecuted; they are prosecuted in only about one-third of cases in which a
corporation receives a federal deferred or nonprosecution agreement. 68
Buell says it gets "trickier" when you have to confront "an actual white-
collar crime."69 The reasons flow from the very phenomenon that Soltes
describes: white-collar criminals may not themselves realize they did
anything wrong, and they were often taking on risks for the benefit of the
corporation, without accountability within the corporation. It can be hard to
decide how to calculate a white-collar sentence, for example, when the
question is what the dollar amount involved was and whether to sentence
purely based on that. Often business criminals do not have prior records,
which is the typical way that sentences are enhanced." Like Blankenship,
they may deny that they knew anything or committed any crime. Buell
contrasts the Enron case, where prosecutors could show that defendants knew
what they were doing, with other cases where it is not so easy to prove
intent." Without the tapes from Blankenship's office, proving that the CEO
was aware would have been very hard. Even with the tapes, the prosecutors
could not prove an intentional felony. We should also be concerned with the
lower-level employees and whether those who were not calling the shots may
be scapegoated while the CEOs get a slap on the wrist.
65. GOVERNOR'S INDEP. INVESTIGATION PANEL, UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE APRIL 5, 2010,
EXPLOSION: A FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES (2011),
http://www.npr.org/documents/201 1/may/giip-massey-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZNM3-F5Z7].
66. Jef Feeley, Secret CEO Recordings Allowed in Massey Mine Blast Trial, INS. J. (Oct. 12,
2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2015/10/12/384591.htm [https://perma.
cc/6W4T-ULQH].
67. Id.
68. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, Too BIG TO JAIL: How PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH
CORPORATIONS 13 (2014) (indicating that in roughly two-thirds of the cases involving deferred
prosecution or nonprosecution agreements and public corporations, no employees were prosecuted);
Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2015)
(same).
69. BUELL, supra note 30, at 232.
70. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for individuals are comprised of two main elements:
offense level and criminal-history category. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2016).
71. BUELL, supra note 30, at 130-36 (discussing the role of state of mind in white-collar
crimes).
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Why not then prosecute the company itself? Buell describes how BP
was criminally fined over four billion dollars.72 This was a record fine for an
environmental crime according to my data on corporate prosecutions.73 But
it was still "only a fraction of the tens of billions" BP paid in civil suits and
for cleanup costs. 7 4 The company's stock price "took a big hit," but the stock
recovered, the company did not suffer, and Buell notes that he "didn't see
anyone avoiding the pumps" at BP stations, "and neither, truth be told, did
[he]."s
Buell is certainly right that putting more people in prison is not the way
to address social problems, whether the problem is corporate crime or the
opioid epidemic. We need stronger corporate regulations to prevent
malfeasance in the first place. Buell suggests doing more to regulate
corporations and make executives feel the consequences of taking harmful
risks.76 But he recognizes how hard this is to do, particularly since most
corporate law is state law.7 We should also hold corporations themselves
accountable for crimes; settlements with corporations need not "expose" a
"dilemma," as Buell suggests. 78 Settlements can force the company to pay
fines, make victims whole, and reform their practices, if they are done right
(although they are often not). 79 Accomplishing those goals, as Buell notes,
requires making compromises.so Only the companies, even with careful
monitoring, can assure that their business practices are reformed. Only
lawmakers and regulators can assure that business practices are held to a high
standard as a matter of law. These are enormously socially costly crimes.
Getting corporate crime right is enormously important. Redefining the legal
duties of corporate managers to include more robust duties to the public, as
Buell suggests, is a very useful proposal." We can require more transparency
in corporate law and increase management responsibility using regulatory
tools, not the blunt instrument of prosecutions.8 2 And perhaps non-criminal
sanctions may be more readily proved.
72. Id. at 112.
73. Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution Registry, U. VA. SCH. L.,
http://1ib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/Corporate-prosecution-registry/browse/browse.html [https://
perma.cc/5D65-Z64N]; see also Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution Registry:
BP Exploration & Production, Inc., U. VA. SCH. L., http://lib.1aw.virginia.edu
/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/detailfiles/983.html [https://perma.cc/KNV4-FZDU]
(documenting a $4 billion fine for environmental crime in the case of United States v. BP
Exploration & Prod., Inc.).
74. BUELL, supra note 30, at 112.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 253.
77. Id. at 256.
78. Id. at 128.
79. Id. at 174-75.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 256.
82. Id. at 255.
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III. Blame the Free Market
At the opposite end of the spectrum lies the other 99%, for whom
income inequality means not just subpar social services but also bargain-
basement criminal justice. Law professor Darryl Brown describes in his
book, Free Market Criminal Justice, how American criminal justice is not so
different in its basic goals from criminal justice in many countries around the
world. We want security in society. We use public police to investigate
crimes. We use public prosecutors to decide who to charge with criminal
offenses. Yet in America criminal punishment is exceptionally extreme in its
severity and in its scale.83 Brown's motivating question is: What is it about
American criminal justice?
The free market, or its ideology at least, may be part of the problem,
Brown argues.84 To call criminal justice a "free" market, when the end result
of a transaction typically puts a person behind bars, requires a certain amount
of irony. Brown takes us to that troubling place with sensitivity and great
attention to detail. In what way is criminal justice a market? What is being
bought and sold is nothing less than life and liberty. In a laissez-faire, free-
market system, the state does not try to even out social inequality. What
laissez-faire attitudes mean for criminal cases is that people get only what
they can afford. The rich can hire a dream team, while poor people may
barely get a lawyer. If you can't afford a lawyer, you get substandard justice.
You may get a public defender, or often worse, a court-appointed lawyer. In
some places, you may be detained for some time before seeing a lawyer. Or
in misdemeanor cases, you may never get a lawyer, despite the serious
consequences of nonfelony convictions. Your lawyer may not have the
wherewithal to investigate your case. Prosecutors will propose a cookie-
cutter plea bargain. If you do not accept it-as your own lawyer will tell
you-the punishment at trial will be more severe. Criminal trials rarely occur
anymore. After you are convicted, liberal market values will define what
happens on appeal and postconviction, including that you will not get a
lawyer postappeal at all, except perhaps in a death penalty case, unless you
can afford one."
This is a free-market system in that everyone gets the legal defense they
can afford.86 Defendants willingly and freely enter contracts to plead guilty
in exchange for a reduced sentence. But that is all a fiction. These plea
contracts can sometimes be about as free and willing as an agreement to pay
83. BROWN, supra note 31, at 1-2.
84. Id. at 3.
85. See id. at 88 ("Instead, as the doctrine now stands, the right to retain counsel with personal
funds gives the fullest protection to a private interest on which the law places great value within
criminal procedure and beyond: the individual right to unfettered market access.").
86. See id. ("The law of privately funded defense is unusually forthright in its embrace of
market values.").
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into a Mafia protection racket. The poor barely get anything resembling a day
in court. They are free to negotiate-from a position of abject
powerlessness-and the market of plea bargaining results in prosecutors
rubber stamping convictions en masse. The system efficiently and cheaply
puts millions of people in prison. If free-market ideology is to blame for our
severe "anything-goes" system, Brown suggests, it may also be to blame for
the reason we place priority on imprisonment: to make sure that property is
kept secure.87
Running with that market analogy, perhaps criminal justice is an
example of a market failure, which is defined as a situation in which goods
and services are not efficiently allocated.88 Why do markets fail? They can
permit abuse of monopoly power. There can be information failures,
including those due to fraud, so people do not fully know what they are
buying or selling. Or preexisting inequality can distort markets. Criminal
justice suffers from all of these faults. Prosecutors have an almost complete
monopoly on power, as Brown describes, and have more control over
sentences and bargains than in just about any other country." Inequality
distorts justice, as public defenders lack resources to effectively handle their
growing caseloads.
Information failures abound, as defendants have scant resources to
investigate the facts or the law that might get them the sentences they really
deserve or no punishment at all. Prosecutors have loose obligations to
disclose the facts to defendants, particularly in cases that are plea bargained.'
Wrongful convictions have exploded in our country, with hundreds
exonerated by DNA testing and over a thousand more by other evidence in
the past few decades, often because so little work is put into investigating
facts before we rush to convict people.9 1 Even our much-vaunted criminal
procedure, layers of appeals, and habeas largely perform symbolic functions,
as Brown describes, and rarely result in meaningful relief.92
Our criminal justice system also embraces the ideology of local
democracy. Local democracy should be checked when minority rights are
severely affected. Should we let a county decide not to fund its public
defenders but still impose harsh justice on the poor? Should we allow states
87. Id. at 198.
88. Id. at 75.
89. Id. at 30.
90. Id. at 141-42; see also United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (holding that the
Constitution does not require the disclosure of impeachment information prior to a guilty plea).
91. See Exonerations by Year: DNA and Non-DNA, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exoneration-by-Year.aspx
[https://perma.cc/V4YB-EPSA] (last visited Oct. 19, 2017) (showing DNA and non-DNA
exonerations by year, from 1989 to 2016, totaling over 2,000).
92. See BROWN, supra note 31, at 208 (concluding that U.S. criminal procedure is designed to
achieve fair process rather than the correct outcome).
174 [Vol. 96:163
The Boom & Bust of American Imprisonment
to tolerate failing public defenders funded only by unreliable and skimpy
traffic-ticket revenues? Should we allow county prosecutors to seek severe
sentences using near-monopoly power? We mass process cases, and we get
mass incarceration, which has enormous social costs.
Nor does it have to be that way. Some jurisdictions do fine without plea
bargaining the bulk of cases, as Brown describes.93 Mass incarceration could
be prevented if we had a system, Brown suggests, in which there were more
meaningful checks and balances on prosecutorial and police power than
democratic accountability through elections.9 4 Some other form of
accountability is needed. As I describe in the Conclusion to this Review,
perhaps those changes are coming-only perhaps-because the market in
criminal justice has come crashing down.
Now, turning back to elite criminals, even a distorted market may not
be so bad for the privileged who can game it in their favor. Actual, not
metaphorical, markets experience cycles of boom and bust. Many have been
concerned that elites profit from these cycles while everyday people suffer
harsh consequences. Corporate prosecutions follow in the wake of market
busts, yet some of the largest business crimes may go unpunished. Buell, who
served as a federal prosecutor, including on the Enron Task Force, explains
why.95 Buell points out that street crimes may be far easier to prove than
complex financial crimes. Yet that does not mean that we should focus
primarily on street crimes. The social consequences of business crimes can
be enormous, as Buell describes. If white-collar offenders ignored
sophisticated legal and business advice and went ahead and committed
crimes, is there any reason to think they are less reprehensible? Crimes like
drug possession punish the low-level addict or corner dealer and not the
kingpin. And unlike business criminals, the poor do not usually get
investigators and lawyers to argue that their individual life stories merits
sympathy and leniency at sentencing. The results when they do get a team,
for example in death penalty cases, are stunning and often make the
difference between a life sentence and a death sentence.96
Can this longstanding inequality in our justice system ever be remedied?
If anything, politics seems to be moving towards tolerating more inequality
in America and not less. We punish street crimes or immigration offenses or
drug possession in massive waves because it is cheap and easy to put people
who lack resources to defend themselves behind bars. The role that race plays
in our willingness to tolerate bargain-basement justice for the poor but not
93. BROWN, supra note 25, at 104-05.
94. See id. at 198-99 (discussing how the United States, like other jurisdictions, "rel[ies] on
public prosecution and police monopolies," despite its distrust of state authority and political
commitment to democracy).
95. BUELL, supra note 24, at xvii-xviii.
96. Brandon L. Garrett, The Decline of the Virginia (and American) Death Penalty, 105 GEO.
L.J. 661, 724-25 (2017).
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for elites cannot be ignored.9 7 The role of race in policing, arrests, and plea
bargaining cannot be ignored either.98
We do not respond the same way to white-collar crime waves. 99 In
business-crime cases, jurors and judges see the full picture of a person's life.
Elites get short sentences. They get fairer justice. We shouldn't wish less on
anyone. The other 99% deserve the same. No one is calling for life in prison
for Wall Street super-predators. The question is whether any will be jailed at
all. We should respond to inequality in criminal justice by ratcheting
punishment down and increasing fairness for all. Buell recommends as much,
as does Brown. Yet both leave us wondering whether that can occur in the
Land of the Free, where ingrained structures and thinking produced mass
incarceration on a scale the world has never before seen. These books,
however, leave us in a place more optimistic than one might suppose.
Conclusion
All three of these wonderful books, from different perspectives, point
towards restorative justice and away from punishment. We need serious
regulatory involvement to prevent corporate crimes from occurring in the
first place. Better resources for mining inspectors could have prevented the
Upper Big Branch disaster. More resources for the SEC and other Wall Street
watchdogs can far more effectively prevent financial crimes than a few token
prosecutions after the fact. Corporations can be rehabilitated, and more minor
offenses and sanctions can be used to prevent corporate misconduct, as Soltes
and Buell suggest.
For more-typical criminal cases, Brown describes how things could be
different, and how they were different when England responded to a similar
crime wave from the 1970s through the 1990s but kept more power in the
hands of judges and did not completely deregulate criminal justice. 0 Local
prosecutors can similarly focus on preventing crime and rehabilitating
communities. Perhaps things can be different in the United States as well,
97. See, e.g., Rebecca Marcus, Racism in Our Courts: The Underfunding of Public Defenders
and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 235-36
(1994) (observing that racial minorities are disproportionally poor and that they disproportionally
require public defenders).
98. For example, a recent study found that race was a statistically significant factor in plea
bargaining and outcomes over a two-year period in Manhattan cases examined by the Vera Institute
for Justice. Gene Demby, Study Reveals Worse Outcomes for Black and Latino Defendants, NPR
(July 17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/07/17/332075947/study-reveals-
worse-outcomes-for-black-and-latino-defendants [https://perma.cc/K535-38AR]; see also, e.g.,
Brad Heath, Racial Gap in U.S. Arrest Rates: 'Staggering Disparity', USA TODAY (Nov. 18, 2014),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/18/ferguson-black-arrest-rates/19043207/
[https://perma.cc/EPV5-GXRE] (pointing out the reality of "racially lopsided arrests" and
discussing the importance of investigating potential causes of the racial disparity in arrest cases).
99. BUELL, supra note 24, at 213.
100. BROWN, supra note 31, at 212-13.
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despite the loosely regulated system that has produced mass incarceration on
the largest scale that the world has ever seen.
Perhaps the boom in mass incarceration in our criminal justice system
is finally turning into a bust, for exactly the reasons and using exactly the
tools that these authors point towards. Whether "common sense" and
"comparative moderation" continue to prevail in the United States remains
in question. But for over a decade, we have started to move away from
criminalizing drugs,10 ' from the death penalty (but not life sentences), 102 and
from overly harsh sentencing laws.103 We have started to shift towards
rehabilitation and alternatives to incarceration, particularly at the state level.
American mass incarceration costs over $180 billion a year, according to a
Prison Policy Initiative estimate that took into account not just the costs of
running prisons (over $80 billion) but also court costs and policing costs."
The social costs borne by families and communities are far greater.' Mass
incarceration, however, has now become a term, and one of opprobrium for
concerned policymakers and citizens on both sides of our political divide.1 06
There are two ways to reduce mass incarceration: admit fewer prisoners
and keep them in prison for less time.'07 Both of those solutions are being
implemented on a greater scale. For example, a "Right on Crime" coalition
of legislators in Texas implemented measures to reduce incarceration by
seventeen percent from 2007 to 2015, and during that time, crime fell by
101. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DRUG SENTENCING TRENDS (July 30,
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/drug-sentencing-trends.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/KG66-Y2PM] ("States are rethinking how they respond to drug crimes" and "have
lowered penalties.").
102. Garrett, supra note 87, at 663.
103. ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN
SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS 4 (July 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/
CJ/TrendsInSentencingAndCorrections.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NHQ-3W62].
104. Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Following the Money ofMass Incarceration, PRISON
POL'Y INITIATIVE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/money.html
[https://perma.cc/H77B-U9VA]. For a wonderful graphical illustration, see Peter Wagner & Leah
Sakala, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie, PRISON POL'Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 12, 2014),
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie.html [https://perma.cc/8VVY-MJ2A] (illustrating
incarceration in the United States).
105. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost ofMass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1276, 1281-85 (2004) (discussing the high social
cost of mass incarceration); Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, The Black Family and Mass
Incarceration, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 221, 225 (2009) (discussing high
incarceration rates in inner cities).
106. David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 1-2 (David Garland ed., 2001); see, e.g.,
Sen. Rand Paul, Keep Pushing Criminal Justice Reform in Ky., COURIER J. (Mar. 28, 2016),
http://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2016/03/28/paul-keep-pushing-criminal-justice-
reform-kyl/82352596/ [https://perma.cc/L7VU-7KUL] (discussing the need for reform).
107. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron
Law ofPrison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 307, 316 (2009).
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twenty-seven percent.108 Texas avoided spending half a billion dollars to
build three prisons and instead closed three prisons, improved access to
probation, addiction treatment, and alternatives to prison, and saved about
three billion dollars.o' California, New Jersey, and New York led the country
in reducing prison populations, by twenty percent or more, and experienced
the largest drops in violent crime." 0 A federal "smart on crime" initiative
supports such efforts to reinvest savings from reducing incarceration by
prevention.'11 More than thirty states have adopted these types of reforms,
including Alaska, Georgia, Ohio, Oklahoma, Kentucky, Maryland,
Mississippi, Texas, and many more.' 12 Suddenly, rehabilitation and reentry
are becoming a new focus for research and policy; some states are restoring
voting rights to felons. 13
Hopefully, those state and local efforts will continue, and these
problems will continue to be studied, so that these efforts can be evaluated
and improved upon. Far more must be done to make more lasting reductions
in mass incarceration, given the scale of the increase in incarceration in this
country in the 1980s and 1990s.' 14 Soltes, Brown, and Buell supply answers
at the top and bottom of our divided criminal justice system, and they suggest
a connection between the two. The mass incarceration binge can come
crashing down, and perhaps it is finally starting to do so. We need less-
punitive responses to our most important social problems. Risky behavior is
108. Tina Rosenberg, Even in Texas, Mass Imprisonment is Going Out of Style, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/14/opinion/even-in-texas-mass-imprisonment-
is-going-out-of-style.html?mcubz-1 [https://perma.cc/Z7Y7-F29Z].
109. Jason Pye, Savings from Prison Reforms in Texas Top $3 Billion, FREEDOMWORKS
(July 6, 2015), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/savings-prison-reforms-texas-top-3-billion-
crines-rates-hit-lowest-point-1968 [https://perma.cc/874E-GXKF].
110. MARC MAUER & NAZGOL GHARDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FEWER
PRISONERS, LESS CRIME: A TALE OF THREE STATES (2014), http://sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Fewer-Prisoners-Less-Crime-A-Tale-of-Three-States.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G9E5-6L5X].
111. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7BD-SG3W] (providing an overview
of a federal approach to reducing incarceration).
112. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BJA JUSTICE REINVESTMENT
INITIATIVE: WHAT IS JRI?, https://www.bja.gov/programs/justicereinvestment/what isjri.html
[https://perma.cc/VUF2-5P9N]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BJA
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE: JRI SITES, https://www.bja.gov/programs/
justicereinvestment/jri-sites.html [https://perma.cc/VQ48-KYEJ].
113. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, FELON VOTING RIGHTS (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/felon-voting-rights.aspx
[https://perma.cc/N8NE-GDXJ] (describing recent state legislation restoring felons' voting rights,
including in Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming).
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hard to deter and punishment is not the best way to prevent it, but punitive
voices are now calling for a turn back to the tough-on-crime 1980s.
Meanwhile, state and local governments are forging ahead with smart-on-
crime reforms. We are at a crossroads. We need voices of reason, like
Soltes's, Buell's, and Brown's, today more than ever.
